Commander A.R. Halfhide, Adventure’s Captain completed an initial report (179/134) dated 16th November. This gives a graphic first-hand account of the incident and its aftermath. Most of it is quoted directly below.
2. H.M.S. "Adventure" - after having been delayed for approximately twenty hours by the non-arrival of her escort due to fog - sailed from Grimsby for Portsmouth at 0932 on 12th. November, 1939, with H.M. Ships "Basilisk" and "Blanche" in company. The visibility was poor, between one and two miles. I decided that if the SUNK HEAD and N.E. GUNFLEET buoys were not sighted it would be necessary to anchor in the BARROW DEEP.
3. These buoys not having been sighted "Adventure" and escort anchored in the Barrow Deep at 2057 on 12th. November, 1939, and were placed at one hour's notice for steam.
4. The visibility had greatly improved by Midnight on 12th. to 13th. November and I decided to weigh and proceed at 0000 on 13th. November, 1939, if by that time the improvement in the visibility had not proved to be only a temporary lifting of the fog. At 0200, no diminution of the visibility having occurred, I gave orders to raise steam and be ready to proceed at 0300. "Adventure" and escort weighed and proceeded at 0305. I decided not to stream paravanes until clear of the narrow waters of the Thames Estuary, as I considered that the danger of encountering mines in these waters was much less than the danger of losing the paravanes should it be necessary top alter course into shoal water, or stop, or go astern if meeting darkened ships either at anchor or under weigh. In this connection I wish to point out that it is not possible to know whether paravanes have been lost until the shoe has been hove up.
[paravanes are a countermeasure against moored mines – they are towed underwater either side of the ship near the bow with the intention of fouling or cutting mines’ mooring cables and possibly of detonating the mine against the paravane rather than the ship itself. I have no details of the exact arrangement used on H.M.S. Adventure]
5. At 0506 speed was reduced from fifteen to nine knots to stream paravanes, when close abreast the TONGUE LIGHT VESSEL and at 0509 (course 124º) the order was passed to "slip paravanes". Both paravanes were slipped and the starboard one ran correctly, but the towing wire of the port paravane fouled the heel fitting of an awning stanchion. It was therefore necessary to recover the paravane and hook it on again for slipping before the shoe could be hove down. This was being done when at 0526½ an explosion occurred just before the bridge on the port side. "Adventure" was then in a position 118º, 3.1 miles, from the charted position of the TONGUE LIGHT VESSEL with "Basilisk" and "Blanche" in single line ahead in that order. The weather at the time was, wind N.N.W. force 2, sea smooth, visibility of unlighted objects about three to four cables.
6. At 0517 I had observed the flash of an explosion bearing 140º and estimated that it had taken place below the horizon at a distance of at least ten miles. No vessel was silhouetted in this flash. I did not hear this explosion although other Officers have since told me that they did.
7. The following resulted from the explosion referred to in paragraph 5 above :-
(a) The fore bridge was wrecked; the standard compass and Eversheds being uprooted and the bridge roof collapsed.
(b) All instrument lights on the bridge went out.
(c) No communication with the Engine Room, either by telephone or telegraphs through the lower steering position - the position in use - could be established as no answer could be obtained from the voice pipe to the lower steering position.
(d) The port siren was operating at full blast and rendered verbal communication on the upper deck almost impossible. (This was afterwards found to have been due to the rigging of the foretopmast - which had snapped off above the control top - fouling the siren lanyard).
(e) All bridge telephones were inoperative.
(f) The ship started turning slowly to starboard.
(g) All Officers and men on the bridge were temporarily stunned by the force of the explosion or by blows received from falling instruments.
8. I was convinced that the explosion was due to a mine and not a torpedo, as I considered that it was too dark for a submarine to have attacked "Adventure". My first endeavour was therefore to stop the ship (a) to prevent her going full circle back into the minefield. (b) to avoid agravating the damage she had sustained by bringing unnecessary pressure on bulkheads. My second was to have a destroyer in close proximity to render assistance in the event of the damage to the ship being serious.
9. Owing to the siren and failure of internal communications it took seven minutes for my order to stop engines to take effect. It also took some considerable time to establish visual communication with the escort, owing to all signalling gear on the bridge and flag deck having been thrown about and smashed by the force of the explosion. In the meantime boats were being turned out and floats prepared for abandoning ship should this be necessary.
10. I eventually received reports that the damage was confined between Nos. 54 and 78 bulkheads and that they were apparently sound. A list of 7º to port was reduced to 4º by pumping oil from port to starboard. It was also reported to me that there was a large number of wounded men and I ordered "Basilisk" alongside to transfer all casualties to her. By 0715 all "get-at-able" casualties had been transferred to "Basilisk" and "Adventure" was ready to proceed under her own steam using the after steering position. I ordered "Basilisk" to lead me into the EDINBOROUGH CHANNEL, giving as wide a berth as possible to the position in which "Adventure" had been mined. "Adventure" went ahead at 0725 at four knots, which was increased to eight knots.At 0747 it was found necessary to stop engines as the oil fuel being fed to the boilers was contaminated with water. "Basilisk" then prepared to take "Adventure" in tow. By 0807 the oil fuel system had been cleared of contaminated oil and the oil was being fed to the boilers from an uncontaminated tank.
11. At 0807 the ship went ahead again at six knots and then increased to eight knots (seven knots throught the water). At 0825 an explosion was observed directly under the stern of "Blanche" and she was seen to lower a boat which went away in her wake. My opinion at the time was that she had dropped a depth charge prematurely, but shortly afterwards she reported that she had been mined and was investigating the damage.
12. At about this time a lifeboat approached the ship from the direction of Margate. I was reluctant to leave "Blanche" unattended and yet considered it advisable not to send "Basilisk" to her assistance for fear that she also might be mined. I therefore endeavoured to direct the lifeboat to "Blanche", but failed to establish communication with her either by semaphore, morse, or international code. She finally turned away steering in the direction of Margate. I then ordered "Basilisk" to leave me, close the lifeboat and send her to "Blanche" and then rejoin me. By this time "Blanche" was out of sight in the haze.
13. At 0952 "Basilisk passed "Adventure" on her way to Sheerness to land casualties and reported "Blanche in tow of a tug. "Adventure" anchored at the Nore at 1128, having been navigated there using the station-pointer for fixing, the fore bridge for conning and the after position for steering.
14 External Communications.
All reports to shore authorities were passed through "Basilisk" as W/T transmission had broken down due to aerials coming down with the foretopmast. That the topmast had been fractured was not realised until daylight. A jury aerial was then rigged and communication established with Whitehall W/T on 138 Kc/s. Even at the Nore communication could not be established with GARISON POINT owing to the failure of power to all ten inch projectors.
15. Damage Sustained.
A superficial examination of the damage revealed that the position of the explosion was in the vicinity of the C.O.2 compartment and that all compartments between Nos. 54 and 78 bulkheads had suffered severe damage. These compartments are as follows:-
HOLD :- Oil Fuel Tanks. Foremost Magazine and Handling Room.
PLATFORM Deck :-
C.O.2 Compartment. Battery Room. Fore Gyro Room.
Ammunition Lobby. Lower Steering Position.
Transmitting Station. Refrigerator Compartments.
Canteen Store.
LOWER DECK:- Kit Locker Flatº. Third W/T Office. Chief Stokers' Messº.
MAIN DECK:- E.R.A's Messº. C.P.O's Messº. Sick Bayº.
UPPER DECK:- Recreation Spaceº. Seamens' Heads.
The superstructure above these spaces, consisting of the Captain's and Navigator's cabins, Signal Distributing Office, Chart House, Wheel House and Bridge all suffered damage, all movable gear and fittings and many fixtures being thrown about by the explosion.
The compartments marked with a º were used for sleeping billets.
16. Damage Control.
Heel. To correct
a list of 7º to
port oil was pumped from the port tanks to the starboard tanks and
starboard bulge. The heel was reduced to 4º.
Pumping. It was decided that no useful work could be done between Nos. 54 and 78 bulkheads. Hold compartments adjacent to these bulkheads were inspected and it was found that a leak had in the Gunner's Store (78 to 90 Port Platform Deck) and Switchboard Room (78 to 90 Middle Line, Platform Deck). These were dealt with by pumping. Shoring was not necessary. The Seamens' Lower Mess Deck later gained a few inches of water and the submersible pump was placed there in readiness, but it was subsequently found that its alternator had been damaged by the explosion.
Commander Halfhide submitted a supplementary report on 21st November which further describes the aftermath of the explosion and the location of the men at the time. Some extracts are included below.
The space between Nos. 54 and 78 bulkheads, containing the compartments enumerated in paragraph 15 of my No. 179/134, was opened up completely on the port side, and partially on the starboard side, from the keel to the upper deck, and contained a mass of twisted metal from frames, bulkheads, beams, pipes, lockers etc. Those portions of the decks which still remained were in some cases two feet deep in oil fuel. The whole of this space was filled with the gases of the explosion, fumes from the C.O.2 Room and oil fuel, and steam from heater pipes. These fumes were intensely irritating to the eyes and throat, and produced symptoms of lacrimation, coughing and nausea. About fifteen minutes after the explosion these fumes were less dense and irritating and the steam had been shut off. The only light available was supplied by hand torches which penetrated but a short distance into the fumes. Everything was smothered with oil fuel and many ladders were either shattered or unshipped. In this space were many wounded men, some trapped by fallen debris or twisted steel, and it was in these conditions that rescue work was carried out, with the constant danger to the rescuers of falling into the bottom of the ship.
ADVENTURE's War Organisation arranged for 50% of the Artisan ratings to sling at the after end of the ship. This proved to be a wise precaution because, not only was the number of casualties reduced, but Artisan ratings were available for Damage Control (There were 5 Shipwrights, 5 Electrical Artificers, and 10 Engine Room Artificers on the casualty list). Had this precaution not been taken all Key Ratings would have been sleeping in the part of the ship which was damaged and none would have been available afterwards, except those actually on watch at the time.